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Abstract
In this paper, we consider dominant strategy implementation in
classical pure exchange economies with free disposal. We show that
quasi-strong-non-bossiness and strategy-proofness together are neces-
sary and sucient for dominant strategy implementation via the direct
revelation mechanism. Moreover, we prove that strategy-proofness is
sucient for dominant strategy implementation, by using an aug-
mented revelation mechanism similar to the one devised by Jackson
et al. (1994). This implies that, in classical pure exchange economies,
dominant strategy implementability by a certain indirect mechanism
is equivalent to truthful implementability in dominant strategy equi-
libria.
Keywords: Quasi-strong-non-bossiness, Strategy-proofness, Augmented
Revelation Mechanism, The Revelation Principle.
JEL Classication Numbers: D51, C72, D71, D78.
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1 Introduction
The revelation principle asserts that if a social choice function is imple-
mentable in dominant strategy equilibria, then it is truthfully implementable
in dominant strategy equilibria (i.e., truthful revelation by each agent is a
dominant strategy equilibrium of the direct revelation mechanism). How-
ever, the direct revelationmechanismmight have untruthfuldominant strat-
egy equilibria, so it might fail to fully implement the social choice function
(e.g., see Dasgupta et al. (1979) for dominant strategy implementation, and
Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986), Repullo (1986), and Palfrey and Srivas-
tava (1989) for Bayesian implementation). Since, as is well-known, this
multiple equilibrium problem depends on the possibility of indierence in
preferences, the problem can arise in a classical pure exchange economy.
Example 1 (A Multiple Equilibrium Problem in an Exchange Economy).
Consider a two-agent, two-good exchange economy with initial endow-
ment point ! = ((6; 4); (4; 6)). Each agent i 2 f1; 2g has two possible types
i; 0i . Agent 1 has preferences represented by
u1((x11; x
2
1);1) = x
1
1

x21
2
and u1((x11; x
2
1);
0
1) =

x11
2
x21;
and agent 2 has preferences represented by
u2((x12; x
2
2);2) = x
1
2x
2
2 and u2((x
1
2; x
2
2);
0
2) =

x12
1=2
+

x22
1=22
:
Consider an individually rational social choice function f dened by
2 02
f = z ! 1
! ! 01
where z = ((4; 6); (6; 4)). The social choice function can be fully imple-
mented in dominant strategy equilibria by an indirect mechanism   =n
m1;m01;m
00
1
o

n
m2;m02
o
; 1

such that
m2 m02
1 =
z ! m1
! ! m01
! y m001
where y = ((7:5; 1:5); (2:5; 8:5)).1 In the mechanism  , agent 1's dominant
strategy ism1 if her type is 1, andm01 if 
0
1; and agent 2's dominant strategy
1This type of indirect mechanism is called an augmented revelation mechanism (see
Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1990)).
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Figure 1: A Two-agent, Two-good Exchange Economy
ism2 if her type is 2, andm02 if 
0
2. Hence,   fully implements f in dominant
strategy equilibria.
Since f is dominant strategy implementable, the revelation principle
implies that telling the truth is a dominant strategy of the direct revela-
tion mechanism  0 =
n
1; 01
o

n
2; 02
o
; f

. However, the direct revelation
mechanism  0 cannot fully dominant strategy implement f , because an
untruthful revelation as well as the truthful announcement is always a dom-
inant strategy of  0 for agent 2, and because, when she plays the untruthful
dominant strategy, the equilibrium outcome does not coincide with the
social goal.2 
Another important topic on the revelation principle is to explore the
relationship between implementation in dominant strategy equilibria and
truthful implementation in dominant strategy equilibria. The revelation
principle states that, in order for social choice functions to be implemented
in dominant strategy equilibria, it is necessary for them to be truthfully im-
plemented indominant strategy equilibria. However, it is still openwhether
truthful implementability (i.e., strategy-proofness) is a sucient condition
for dominant strategy implementation in pure exchange economies.
2The multiple equilibrium problem in dominant strategy implementation might not be
disturbing, because, to quote Dasgupta et al. (1979), [i]n direct mechanisms where telling
the truth is one of several dominant strategies, it may be reasonable to suppose that players
will in fact tell the truth. (See also Chapter 23 in Mas-Colell et al. (1995).) However, since
each agent is indierent among dominant strategies irrespective of messages of the other
agents, there is no guarantee that she will play truthful dominant strategies. Indeed, recent
experimental results indicate that agents can choose a spiteful strategy (e.g., see Saijo (2005)).
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These problems do not arise when indierence in preferences is not
allowed, because three notions of dominant strategy implementation
truthful implementation, implementation by the direct revelation mech-
anism, and implementation with indirect mechanismsare equivalent in
the sense of implementability. In this case, the revelation principle has a
more powerful implication: in order to nd out dominant strategy imple-
mentable social choice functions, it is necessary and sucient to search for
social choice functions that are truthfully implementable in dominant strat-
egy equilibria.3 However, when indierence is possible, the equivalence
does not in general hold. Thus, the revelation principle loses the powerful
implication, because not all truthfully implementable social choice func-
tions may be able to be fully implemented in dominant strategy equilibria
not only by the direct revelation mechanism but also by any indirect mech-
anism. In this paper, we explore the relationships among three notions of
dominant strategy implementation to examine the implications of revela-
tion principle in classical pure exchange economies with free disposal.
First, we search for conditions that are necessary and sucient for a so-
cial choice function to be implemented4 in dominant strategy equilibria by
the direct revelation mechanism. In Theorem 1, we show that quasi-strong-
non-bossiness is a necessary condition for dominant strategy implementation
via the direct revelationmechanism in pure exchange economies. Quasi-strong-
non-bossiness requires that if a change in one agent's type keeps her utility
unchanged irrespective of the other agents' types, then the consumption bundle
of each agent should not be changed. This is a version of non-bossiness,5 the
requirement that if a change in one agent's type retains her consumption bun-
dle unchanged, then the bundle of each agent should be unchanged. Note
that quasi-strong-non-bossiness is not a necessary condition for dominant
strategy implementation if indirect mechanisms can be used. Example 1
above demonstrates the existence of a social choice function that fails to sat-
isfy quasi-strong-non-bossiness but which is implementable in dominant
strategy equilibria via an indirect mechanism.
In Theorem 2, we prove that quasi-strong-non-bossiness and strategy-
proofness together are sucient conditions for dominant strategy imple-
mentation by the direct revelation mechanism. Therefore, it follows from
the revelation principle and Theorems 1 and 2 that a social choice function
is dominant strategy implementable via the direct revelation mechanism in
pure exchange economies if and only if it satises both quasi-strong-non-
bossiness and strategy-proofness (Corollary 1).6 A well-known example
3This is because every social choice function that is truthfully implementable in dominant
strategy equilibria can be fully implemented in dominant strategy equilibria.
4The term implement should be interpreted as fully implement hereafter.
5Non-bossiness was rst introduced by Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981).
6Saijo et al. (2004) has independently obtained necessary and sucient conditions for
dominant strategy implementation via the direct revelation mechanism.
5
of social choice functions satisfying both quasi-strong-non-bossiness and
strategy-proofness is the so-called xed-price rule (see Barbera and Jackson
(1995) for details of the xed-price rule).
Next, we look for a sucient condition for dominant strategy imple-
mentation when indirect mechanisms are allowed to be used. In Theorem
3, we construct an augmented revelation mechanism similar to the one
that Jackson et al. (1994) devised for undominated Nash implementation,
so that we prove that strategy-proofness is a sucient condition for social
choice functions to be dominant strategy implemented in pure exchange
economies. This theorem answers the open question mentioned above.
Together with the revelation principle, Theorem 3 leads to Corollary
2: every strategy-proof social choice function is dominant strategy imple-
mentable in pure exchange economies. This reveals a stark contrast between
the set of social choice functions that can be implemented in dominant strat-
egy equilibria with a certain indirect mechanism, and that of social choice
functions that can be implemented in dominant strategy equilibria with
the direct revelation mechanism. An important social choice function that
satises strategy-proofness but violates quasi-strong-non-bossiness is an
inversely dictatorial social choice function,7 i.e., one where there exists some
agent who always receives nothing. It might appear that inversely dicta-
torial social choice functions cannot be implemented in dominant strategy
equilibria. But, Corollary 2 indicates that they are dominant strategy im-
plementable by a certain indirectmechanism.
The robustness of implementation has recently deserved attention in
implementation theory (e.g., see Bergemann and Morris (2003) for details).
From this point of view, dominant strategy implementation has an ad-
vantage, because it does not need strong assumptions on the information
structure: it needs neither common knowledge about each other's types
nor common knowledge about prior beliefs over type proles.
The Related Literature
This paper closely relates to both Jackson et al. (1994) and Sjo¨stro¨m (1994),
which showed that almost all social choice functions are implementable in
undominated Nash equilibria by a bounded mechanism. One might guess
that all of the strategy-proof social choice functions are implementable in
dominant strategy equilibria by their mechanisms. Indeed, for almost ev-
ery strategy-proof social choice function, it is easy to check that the truthful
revelation of own type by each agent is the unique dominant strategy equi-
librium of their mechanisms; thus their mechanisms can implement it in
7Inversely dictatorial social choice functions are considered important in the sense that
Zhou (1991) conjectured that it is only inversely dictatorial social choice functions that satisfy
both strategy-proofness andPareto eciency inpure exchange economieswith threeormore
agents.
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dominant strategy equilibria. However, not all strategy-proof social choice
functions are dominant strategy implementable by their mechanisms. In
fact, their mechanisms cannot dominant strategy implement inversely dic-
tatorial social choice functions, because their mechanisms cannot imple-
ment any social choice function that gives the zero consumption bundle
to some agent.8 In contrast, our mechanism constructed in the proof of
Theorem 3 can implement every social choice function whenever the social
choice function satises strategy-proofness.
This paper is also related to implementation in undominated strate-
gies with a bounded mechanism. In fact, our bounded mechanism can
implement strategy-proof social choice functions via undominated strate-
gies in pure exchange economies. Jackson (1992) considered implementa-
tion in undominated strategies with a bounded mechanism, and showed
that strategy-proofness is a necessary condition for bounded implemen-
tation in undominated strategies. Thus, combining the result of Jackson
(1992), we can conclude that strategy-proofness is both necessary and suf-
cient for bounded implementation via undominated strategies in pure ex-
change economies (Theorem 4). The result indicates that, in pure exchange
economies, dominant strategy implementation is equivalent to bounded im-
plementation in undominated strategies, in the sense that every dominant
strategy implementable social choice function can be boundedly imple-
mented in undominated strategies, and vice versa. This is the same result
as in voting environments with only strict preferences (e.g., see Jackson
(1992) and Jackson and Srivastava (1996) for details).
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and
gives some denitions. We explore dominant strategy implementation by
thedirect revelationmechanism inSection 3. In Section 4, dominant strategy
implementation by an indirect mechanism is considered. Section 5 contains
some concluding remarks.
2 The Model
Consider a pure exchange economy with free disposal. Let N := f1; 2; : : : ;ng be
the set of agents, where 2  n < +1. Let L := f1; 2; : : : ; lg be the set of goods,
where 2  l < +1. The set of feasible allocations is
A :=
8>><>>:(a1; a2; : : : ; an) 2 Rl+ Rl+     Rl+
 Xi2N ai 
X
i2N
!i
9>>=>>; ;
where ai 2 Rl+ denotes agent i's consumption bundle and !i 2 Rl++ denotes
agent i's initial endowment.
8This is why it has not yet been proved that strategy-proofness is a sucient condition
for dominant strategy implementation in pure exchange economies.
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For each agent i 2 N, leti be the set of all types, each ofwhich prescribes
her preference relation over Rl+. Each agent i 2 N is equipped with a utility
function ui : Rl+  i ! R. We assume that each agent is selsh, i.e., she
cares only about her own consumption bundle. For each agent i 2 N, let
Ei  i be agent i's set of admissible types: i 2 Ei if and only if ui(;i)
is (i) continuous, (ii) strictly increasing, and (iii) strictly quasi-concave. A type
prole is a list  = (1; 2; : : : ; n) 2 E, where E := E1 E2     En .
A social choice function is a single-valued function f : E ! A that assigns
a feasible allocation a 2 A to each type prole  2 E.
LetMi denote a message or strategy space of agent i 2 N. We call mi 2 Mi
a message or strategy of agent i 2 N. A mechanism is a pair   = (M; 1), where
M := M1 M2     Mn and 1 : M ! A is an outcome function. Given a
mechanism (M; 1), let 1i denote agent i's outcome of the mechanism. Given a
social choice function f , a mechanism (M; 1) is the direct revelation mechanism
ifMi = Ei for every i 2 N and 1 = f . A message or strategy prole is denoted
by m = (m1;m2; : : : ;mn) 2 M.
A strategy mi 2 Mi is a dominant strategy of mechanism (M; 1) at i 2 Ei
if ui(1(mi ;m i);i)  ui(1(m0i ;m i);i) for all m0i 2 Mi and all m i 2 M i. For
each agent i 2 N, let DS i (i)  Mi be the set of her dominant strategies of
mechanism   at i 2 Ei .
A strategy prolem = (m1;m

2; : : : ;m

n) 2 M is a dominant strategy equilib-
rium ofmechanism (M; 1) at 2 E if, for any agent i 2 N, ui(1(mi ;m i);i) 
ui(1(m0i ;m i);i) for any m
0
i 2 Mi and any m i 2 M i. Let DSE () :=
DS 1(1)  DS 2(2)      DS n(n)  M be the set of all dominant strat-
egy equilibria of mechanism   at  2 E. With an abuse of notation,
we write DSE () = (DS 1(1);DS
 
2(2); : : : ;DS
 
n(n)) for any  2 E. Let
1(DSE ()) :=
n
a 2 A
 a = 1(m) for some m 2 DSE () o be the set of domi-
nant strategy equilibrium outcomes of mechanism   = (M; 1) at  2 E.
A mechanism   = (M; 1) dominant strategy implements a social choice
function f if 1(DSE ()) = f () for any  2 E.9 A social choice function
f is implementable in dominant strategy equilibria if there exists a mechanism
  = (M; 1) such that 1(DSE ()) = f () for all  2 E.
Remark 1. The single-valuedness of a social choice function, say f , implies
that if amechanism  = (M; 1) implements f in dominant strategy equilibria,
then, for each  2 E, 1(DSE ()) is a singleton, i.e., 1(m) = 1(m0) for any
m;m0 2 DSE ().
Remark 2. If a social choice function f is implementable in dominant strat-
egy equilibria by the direct revelationmechanism   = (M1M2  Mn; 1)
where Mi = Ei for every i 2 N and 1 = f , then
S
i2Ei DS
 
i (i) = 
E
i = Mi
9To simplify notation, we write 1(DSE ()) =

f ()
	
as 1(DSE ()) = f ().
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for any i 2 N, because truth telling is a dominant strategy of the direct
revelation mechanism for all i 2 Ei and all i 2 N.
Now we introduce two properties of social choice functions. Strategy-
proofness is an incentive compatibility requirement that no agent should
be able to change her type in a way that results in a direct gain to her,
irrespective of the other agents' types.
Denition1 (Strategy-proofness). Asocial choice function f satises strategy-
proofness if, for all  2 E and all i 2 N, there is no 0i 2 Ei such that
ui( f (0i ;  i);i) > ui( f ();i):
Quasi-strong-non-bossiness, which is a version of non-bossiness,10 requires
that if a change in one agent's type does not aect her utility regardless of
the other agents' types, then it does not change the consumption bundle
everyone receives.
Denition 2 (Quasi-strong-non-bossiness). A social choice function f sat-
ises quasi-strong-non-bossiness if, for all i 2 N and all i; 0i 2 Ei , if
ui( f ();i) = ui( f (0i ;  i);i) for all  i 2 E i, then
f () = f (0i ;  i) for all  i 2 E i :
Remark3. Quasi-strong-non-bossiness isweaker than strong-non-bossiness,1112
which is a stronger version of non-bossiness.
We can easily rewrite the denition of quasi-strong-non-bossiness as
follows: a social choice function f satises quasi-strong-non-bossiness if, for
all  2 E, all i 2 N, and all 0i 2 Ei , if ui( f ();i) = ui( f (0i ;  i);i) for all
 i 2 E i, then f () = f (0i ;  i). It is easy to check that this is equivalent to
weak non-bossiness dened in Saijo et al. (2004).
3 Implementation by the Direct Mechanism
In this section, we identify a necessary and sucient condition for a so-
cial choice function to be dominant strategy implemented via the direct
revelation mechanism in pure exchange economies.
We begin by providing a necessary condition for dominant strategy
implementation via the direct revelation mechanism.
10A social choice function f satises non-bossiness if, for all i 2 N, all i; 0i 2 Ei , and all
 i 2 E i, if fi() = fi(0i ;  i), then f () = f (0i ;  i).
11A social choice function f satises strong-non-bossiness if, for all i 2 N, all i; 0i 2 Ei ,
and all  i 2 E i, if ui( f ();i) = ui( f (0i ;  i);i), then f () = f (0i ;  i).
12Ritz (1983) rst introduced the notion of strong-non-bossiness, called non-corruptibility.
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Theorem 1. If a social choice function f is dominant strategy implementable
by the direct revelation mechanism in pure exchange economies, then it satises
quasi-strong-non-bossiness.
Proof. Pick any i 2 N and any i; 0i 2 Ei such that
ui( f ();i) = ui( f (0i ;  i);i) for all  i 2 E i : (1)
Since f is implementable in dominant strategy equilibria via the direct
revelation mechanism   = (E; f ), it holds that
f (DSE ()) = f () for all  2 E; (2)
where f (DSE ()) =
n
a 2 A
 a = f () for some  2 DSE () o. Substituting
(2) for f in (1), we obtain
ui( f (DSE ());i) = ui( f (DSE (0i ;  i));i) for all  i 2 E i : (3)
Suppose i 2 DS i (0i ). Then, it follows from (3) and Remark 1 that
ui( f (DS i (i);DS
 
 i( i));i) = ui( f (DS
 
i (
0
i );DS
 
 i( i));i)
= ui( f ( i;DS  i( i));i)
for all  i 2 E i. This implies that
ui( f ( i;  i);i) = ui( f (DS i (i);  i);i)
for any  i 2 E i =
Q
j,i
S
 j2Ej DS
 
j ( j)

by Remark 2, so we obtain i 2
DS i (i). Therefore, DS
 
i (
0
i )  DS i (i).
Since DS i (
0
i )  DS i (i), we have
f (DS i (
0
i );DS
 
 i( i))  f (DS i (i);DS  i( i)) for all  i 2 E i : (4)
Substituting (2) for f in (4), we have
f (0i ;  i)  f ()
for all  i 2 E i. Therefore, by the single-valuedness of f , we obtain
f (0i ;  i) = f ()
for all  i 2 E i. 
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Next, we look for sucient conditions for dominant strategy implemen-
tation by the direct revelation mechanism. If a social choice function satis-
es both quasi-strong-non-bossiness and strategy-proofness, then there is
always a unique dominant strategy equilibrium outcome in the direct revelation
mechanism (although there may exist some dominant strategy equilibria
in the mechanism). So, since the direct revelation mechanism rules out
undesired equilibrium outcomes, the mechanism can implement the social
choice function in dominant strategy equilibria.13
Theorem 2. If a social choice function f satises both quasi-strong-non-bossiness
and strategy-proofness, then it is dominant strategy implementable by the direct
revelation mechanism in pure exchange economies.
Proof. Consider the direct revelation mechanism   = (M; 1) whereMi = Ei
for every i 2 N and 1 = f . Since f satises strategy-proofness, ui( f ();i) 
ui( f (0i ;  i);i) for all  2 E, all i 2 N, and all 0i 2 Ei , implying that
i 2 DS i (i) for all i 2 N and all i 2 Ei ; i.e.,  2 DSE () for any  2 E.
So, we have f (DSE ()) =
n
a 2 A
 a = f () for some  2 DSE () o   f ()	
for every  2 E.
Suppose ¯i 2 DS i (i). Then, since i; ¯i 2 DS i (i),
ui( f (i;  i);i)  ui( f (¯i;  i);i) for all  i 2 E i
and
ui( f (i;  i);i)  ui( f (¯i;  i);i) for all  i 2 E i :
These imply that
ui( f ();i) = ui( f (¯i;  i);i)
for all  i 2 E i. So, quasi-strong-non-bossiness implies that
f () = f (¯i;  i) for any  i 2 E i :
Thus, f (¯i;  i) = f () for ¯i 2 DS i (i) and any  i 2 E i, which implies
that f (DS i (i);  i) = f () for any  i 2 E i. Since similar arguments hold
for any i 2 Ei , we obtain f (DS i (i);  i) = f () for any i 2 Ei and any
 i 2 E i, i.e., for any  2 E.
Iteration of these arguments for further agents in N establishes that
f (DSE ()) = f () for all  2 E. 
13Laont and Maskin (1982) proposed the notion of strictly truthful implementation, which
requires that the direct revelation mechanism should have no untruthful dominant strategy
equilibria. It is easy to see that not all strategy-proof and quasi-strong-non-bossy social
choice functions are strictly truthfully implementable in dominant strategy equilibria be-
cause the direct revelation mechanisms may have untruthful dominant strategy equilibria.
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By the revelation principle, if a social choice function is implementable
in dominant strategy equilibria, then truth telling by each agent is a domi-
nant strategy equilibrium of the direct revelation mechanism, i.e., the social
choice function satises strategy-proofness. Therefore, combinedwith The-
orems 1 and 2, this leads to the following corollary.
Corollary 1. A social choice function f is dominant strategy implementable via
the direct revelationmechanism in pure exchange economies if and only if it satises
both quasi-strong-non-bossiness and strategy-proofness.
Note that Corollary 1 holds evenwhen the set of feasible allocations con-
sists of all balanced allocations. It is easy to check that the social choice func-
tion dened in Example 1 satises strategy-proofness but violates quasi-
strong-non-bossiness. Therefore, as seen in the example, the social choice
function is not implementable in dominant strategy equilibria via the direct
revelation mechanism. In contrast, xed-price social choice functions (Bar-
bera and Jackson (1995)), as well as dictatorial ones, satisfy both strategy-
proofness and quasi-strong-non-bossiness, so they are dominant strategy
implementable by the direct revelation mechanisms.
4 Implementation by an Indirect Mechanism
In Section3,we showthat strategy-proofness andquasi-strong-non-bossiness
are both necessary and sucient for dominant strategy implementation via
the direct revelation mechanism. In this section, we search for a condition
that is sucient for social choice functions to be implemented in dominant
strategy equilibria. Before proceeding, let us introduce two properties on
environments and the denition of weakly dominated strategies.
Property 1 (ACommonWorstAllocation). There existsw = (w1;w2; : : : ;wn) 2
A such that ui(a;i)  ui(w;i) for all i 2 N, all i 2 Ei , and all a 2 f (E),
where f (E) :=
n
a 2 A
 a = f () for some  2 E o.
Property 1 says that there exists an allocation that is always considered
to be the worst allocation for any agent. For instance, by setting w =
(0; 0; : : : ; 0), Property 1 is satised in our environments.
Given w 2 A that satises Property 1, let
C+w :=
8>><>>:(c1; c2; : : : ; cl) 2 Rl+
 ch  maxi2N whi and ch  Xi2N !hi for all h 2 L
9>>=>>; :
The next property is strict value distinction which was introduced by
Palfrey and Srivastava (1991).
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Property 2 (Strict Value Distinction). For all i 2 N and all i; 0i 2 Ei , if
i , 0i , then there exist c; c 2 C+w such that ui(c;i) > ui(c;i) and ui(c;0i ) <
ui(c;0i ).
Property 2 requires that if types change, then indierence curves cross
somewhere in C+w. Note that Properties 1 and 2 hold in our environments,
i.e., in pure exchange economies with free disposal and with continuous,
strictly increasing, and strictly convex preferences. In fact, these proper-
ties are satised in many environments (see Jackson et al. (1994) for other
examples of environments where Properties 1 and 2 are satised).
A strategy mi 2 Mi is a weakly dominated strategy of mechanism (M; 1)
at i 2 Ei if there exists a strategy m0i 2 Mi such that ui(1(m0i ;m i);i) 
ui(1(mi;m i);i) for allm i 2 M i and ui(1(m0i ;m i);i) > ui(1(mi;m i);i) for
some m i 2 M i. In this case, m0i is said to weakly dominate mi at i 2 Ei .
We are nowready to state themain result regarding a sucient condition
for dominant strategy implementation in pure exchange economies.
Theorem 3. If a social choice function f satises strategy-proofness, then it is
dominant strategy implementable in pure exchange economies.
Proof. For a strategy-proof social choice function f , pickw = (w1;w2; : : : ;wn) 2
A in a way that satises Property 1. Let
C++w :=
8>><>>:(c1; c2; : : : ; cl) 2 Rl++
 ch > maxi2N whi and ch  Xi2N !hi for all h 2 L
9>>=>>; :
Now we construct an augmented revelation mechanism   = (M; 1),
where M = M1  M2      Mn, by using ideas similar to those of the
mechanism constructed by Jackson et al. (1994) for undominated Nash
implementation. Agent i's message space is
Mi := Ei [ (C+w  C+w):
That is, each agent announces either own type or a pair of consumption
bundles. A typical message for agent i 2 N is denoted by mi = ii or (ci; ci).
The outcome function 1 is dened as follows.
Rule 1: If all agents announce their types, i.e.,mi = ii 2 Ei for all i 2 N, then
1(m) := f (11; 
2
2; : : : ; 
n
n). Note that, by Property 1, ui(1(m);ii)  ui(w;ii) for
all i 2 N and all ii 2 Ei .
Rule 2: Suppose that only one agent, say i, announces her type and all other
agents j , i announce a pair of consumption bundles, i.e., mi = ii 2 Ei and
m j = (c j; c j) 2 (C+w  C+w) for any j , i. Then,
1i(m) := argmax
c2C¯
ui(c;ii); where C¯ :=
n
c j; c j 2 C+w
 j , i o ;
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and, for any j , i,
1 j(m) := z j; where zhj := max
8>><>>: w
h
jP
j,iwhj
0BBBBB@X
i2N
whi   1hi (m)
1CCCCCA ; 0
9>>=>>; for any h 2 L:
Note that ties are broken in somearbitrarymannerunless argmaxc2C¯ ui(c;ii)
is a singleton, and that whj
.P
j,iwhj := 0 if
P
j,iwhj = 0. Note also that
1i(m)  wi because c  wi for all c 2 C¯, and that 1 j(m)  w j for all j , i by
construction.
Rule 3: In all other cases, 1(m) := w.
We want to show that DS i (i) = fig for all i 2 N and all i 2 Ei .
Step 1: For each agent, announcing a pair of consumption bundles is
weakly dominated by the truthful revelation of own type.
Suppose that the true type prole is  = (1; 

2; : : : ; 

n). Let mi 2 Mi be
such that mi = (ci; ci) 2 (C+w  C+w), and m0i 2 Mi be such that m0i = i .
Case 1-1: m j = 
j
j 2 Ej for all j , i.
We have 1(mi;m i) = w and 1(m0i ;m i) = f (

i ; 
 i
 i) by Rule 3 and by Rule
1, respectively. Since ui( f (i ; 
 i
 i);

i )  ui(w;i ) by Property 1, we obtain
ui(1(m0i ;m i);

i )  ui(1(mi;m i);i ) for any m i 2 E i.
Case 1-2: m j = (c j; c j) 2 (C+w  C+w) for all j , i.
We have 1(mi;m i) = w by Rule 3, while 1i(m0i ;m i) = argmaxc2C¯ ui(c;

i ) by
Rule 2, where C¯ =
n
c j; c j 2 C+w
 j , i o. Since c  wi for all c 2 C¯ by construc-
tion, we obtain 1i(m0i ;m i)  1i(mi;m i), which implies ui(1(m0i ;m i);i ) 
ui(1(mi;m i);i ) for anym i 2 (C+wC+w)n 1. In particular, since c > wi for all
c 2 C¯ by construction if m¯ j = (c j; c j) 2 (C++w C++w )  (C+wC+w) for all j , i, we
have 1i(m0i ; m¯ i) > 1i(mi; m¯ i), implying ui(1(m
0
i ; m¯ i);

i ) > ui(1(mi; m¯ i);

i )
for m¯ i 2 (C++w  C++w )n 1.
Case 1-3: m j = 
j
j 2 Ej for some j , i and mk = (ck; ck) 2 (C+w  C+w) for all
k 2 N n fi; jg.
It follows fromRule 2 that1i(mi;m i) = zi, where zhi = max

whiP
i, j whi
P
i2N whi   1hj (m)

; 0

for any h 2 L. On the other hand, 1(m0i ;m i) = w by Rule 3. Since wi  zi,
we get ui(1(m0i ;m i);

i )  ui(1(mi;m i);i ) for any m i 2 Ej (C+w  C+w)n 2.
Case 1-4: All other cases.
Rule 3 implies1(mi;m i) = wand1(m0i ;m i) = w, implyingui(1(m
0
i ;m i);

i ) 
ui(1(mi;m i);i ).
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The above cases together establish thatmi isweakly dominated bym0i . Thus,
announcing a pair of consumption bundles is weakly dominated by telling
the truth.
Step 2: For every agent, misrepresenting own type is weakly dominated
by the truthful announcement of own type.
Suppose that the true type prole is  = (1; 

2; : : : ; 

n). Let mi 2 Mi be
such that mi = ii 2 Ei nfi g, and m0i 2 Mi be such that m0i = i .
Case 2-1: m j = 
j
j 2 Ej for all j , i.
Rule 1 implies 1(mi;m i) = f (ii; 
 i
 i) and 1(m
0
i ;m i) = f (

i ; 
 i
 i). Since
strategy-proofness implies ui( f (i ; 
 i
 i);

i )  ui( f (ii;  i i);i ), we obtain
ui(1(m0i ;m i);

i )  ui(1(mi;m i);i ) for any m i 2 E i.
Case 2-2: m j = (c j; c j) 2 (C+w  C+w) for all j , i.
It follows from Rule 2 that 1i(mi;m i) = argmaxc2C¯ ui(c;ii) and 1i(m
0
i ;m i) =
argmaxc2C¯ ui(c;i ), where C¯ =
n
c j; c j 2 C+w
 j , i o. Since agent i's true type is
i , we obtain ui(1(m
0
i ;m i);

i )  ui(1(mi;m i);i ) for anym i 2 (C+wC+w)n 1.
Suppose in turn that agent i's true type is ii. Then, since her true type is 
i
i,
ui(1(m0i ;m i);
i
i)  ui(1(mi;m i);ii) for any m i 2 (C+w  C+w)n 1. Especially,
by Property 2, we have
ui(1(m0i ; m¯ i);

i ) > ui(1(mi; m¯ i);

i )
and
ui(1(m0i ; m¯ i);
i
i) < ui(1(mi; m¯ i);
i
i)
for some m¯ i 2 (C+w  C+w)n 1; otherwise, for any m¯ i 2 (C+w  C+w)n 1, (i) if
ui(1(m0i ; m¯ i);

i ) > ui(1(mi; m¯ i);

i ), thenui(1(m
0
i ; m¯ i);
i
i) = ui(1(mi; m¯ i);
i
i),
(ii) ifui(1(m0i ; m¯ i);
i
i) < ui(1(mi; m¯ i);
i
i), thenui(1(m
0
i ; m¯ i);

i ) = ui(1(mi; m¯ i);

i ),
or (iii)ui(1(m0i ; m¯ i);

i ) = ui(1(mi; m¯ i);

i ) andui(1(m
0
i ; m¯ i);
i
i) = ui(1(mi; m¯ i);
i
i),
all of which contradict Property 2.14
Case 2-3: All other cases.
By Rule 3, we have 1(mi;m i) = w and 1(m0i ;m i) = w, which implies
ui(1(m0i ;m i);

i )  ui(1(mi;m i);i ).
The above cases together establish thatmi isweakly dominated bym0i . Thus,
misreporting own type is weakly dominated by truthful reporting.
Steps 1 and 2 together imply that the truthful revelation of own type
weakly dominates both announcements of a pair of consumption bundles
14This is because, in any case, there are no c; c 2 C+w such that ui(c;i ) > ui(c;i )  ui(w;i )
and ui(c;ii) > ui(c;
i
i)  ui(w;ii).
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and false reports of own type. Thus, we establish that DS i (i) = fig for all
i 2 N and all i 2 Ei ; i.e., DSE () = fg for all  2 E. Therefore, we can
conclude from Rule 1 that 1(DSE ()) = f () for all  2 E. 
Note that our mechanism works not only for n > 3 but also for n = 2,
as the mechanism of Jackson et al. (1994) works. Note also that Theorem
3 is critically dependent on Property 1. This is because it is impossible to
punish agents who do not announce their truthful types if Property 1 does
not hold.
The following corollary follows immediately from the revelation prin-
ciple and Theorem 3.
Corollary 2. A social choice function f is dominant strategy implementable in
pure exchange economies if and only if it satises strategy-proofness.
Corollary 2 tells us that every strategy-proof social choice function is
implementable in dominant strategy equilibria if indirect mechanisms are
allowed to be used. This is in stark contrast to Corollary 1, because it states
that only quasi-strong-non-bossy and strategy-proof social choice functions
are dominant strategy implementable by the direct revelation mechanism.
A well-known social choice function that satises strategy-proofness
but fails to satisfy quasi-strong-non-bossiness is an inversely dictatorial one,
which was introduced by Zhou (1991). So, it follows from Corollaries 1 and
2 that inversely dictatorial social choice functions are not implementable in
dominant strategy equilibria by the direct revelation mechanism, but are
implementable in dominant strategy equilibria by the indirect mechanism
constructed in the proof of Theorem 3.
As mentioned before, our mechanism appears to be similar to the one
devised by Jackson et al. (1994). Indeed, their mechanism as well as the
mechanism constructed by Sjo¨stro¨m (1994) can dominant strategy imple-
ment almost all social choice functionswhenever the social choice functions
satisfy strategy-proofness. However, an important dierence is that our
mechanism can implement inversely dictatorial social choice functions in
dominant strategy equilibria, whereas their mechanisms cannot dominant
strategy implement the social choice functions.15 Thus, our mechanism
has the advantage of being able to implement strategy-proof social choice
functions that assign someone the zero consumption bundle (although the
advantage is somewhat limited because our mechanism is not necessarily
useful for undominated Nash implementation).
We conclude this section with a brief discussion of implementation in
another equilibrium concept. Since our boundedmechanism constructed in
the proof of Theorem3 can implement strategy-proof social choice functions
15The dierence stems from the fact that Jackson et al. (1994) and Sjo¨stro¨m (1994) needed
a slightly stronger property than Property 1.
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even in undominated strategies, Theorem 3 implies the following theorem
when coupled with Corollary 1 in Jackson (1992) which says that strategy-
proofness is necessary for implementation in undominated strategies by a
bounded mechanism.
Theorem 4. A social choice function f is implementable via undominated strate-
gies with a boundedmechanism in pure exchange economies if and only if it satises
strategy-proofness.
Theorem 4 indicates that, in pure exchange economies, implementation
in dominant strategy equilibria is equivalent to bounded implementation in
undominated strategies, in the sense that the set of social choice functions
implementable in dominant strategy equilibria coincides with that of social
choice functions boundedly implementable in undominated strategies.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have considered the relationships among three notions
of dominant strategy implementation in classical pure exchange economies
with free disposal.16 First, in Theorem 1, we have shown that quasi-strong-
non-bossiness is necessary for social choice functions to be dominant strat-
egy implemented by the direct revelation mechanism. Next, in Theorem
2, we have proved that quasi-strong-non-bossiness and strategy-proofness
together are sucient for dominant strategy implementation by the direct
revelationmechanism. Finally, in Theorem 3, we have proved that strategy-
proofness is sucient for dominant strategy implementation, by using an
augmented revelation mechanism.
Since there exists a social choice function that is strategy-proof butwhich
is not quasi-strong-non-bossy (e.g., an inversely dictatorial social choice
function), Theorems 13 together with the revelation principle imply the
following relationships: from the point of view of implementability in clas-
sical pure exchange economies with free disposal, (i) dominant strategy
implementation via the direct revelation mechanism implies, but is not
implied by, dominant strategy implementation by a certain indirect mech-
anism, and (ii) dominant strategy implementation via a certain indirect
mechanism is identical to truthful implementation in dominant strategy
equilibria. As noted in the introduction, when indierence is possible, the
revelation principle loses the powerful implication. However, our theorems
indicate that, in classical pure exchange economies with free disposal, the
16It is worth noting that Theorems 13 hold not only in classical pure exchange economies
with free disposal but also in other environments where Properties 1 and 2 introduced in
Section 4 are satised; furthermore, Theorems 1 and 2 hold even without Properties 1 and
2.
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revelation principle has the same powerful implication as in the case where
indierence is impossible.
It is worth discussing relationships among dominant strategy imple-
mentation, Nash implementation, and bounded implementation in un-
dominated Nash equilibria. It might seem at rst glance that all of the
dominant strategy implementable social choice functions are both Nash
implementable and boundedly implementable in undominated Nash equi-
libria. However, there is no relationship among them, because inversely
dictatorial social choice functions are dominant strategy implementable but
are not boundedly implementable in undominated Nash equilibria as well
as not being Nash implementable.
Our mechanism constructed in the proof of Theorem 3 is similar to the
mechanism of Jackson et al. (1994); thus our mechanism possesses worri-
some features as their mechanism possesses. For instance, as mentioned
before, our mechanism makes frequent use of Property 1 to punish agents
who do not truthfully announce their types. Property 1 is consistent with
pure exchange economies with free disposal, but would hardly seem con-
sistent with ones without free disposal. It is an interesting topic for further
research to construct a more natural mechanism for dominant strategy
implementation.
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